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Draft Order
on securily of the associate purtners afier the NATO Summit
The Assembly.
(i) Noting that NATO's Membership Action Plan as decided at the Washingon Summit on 23-24
April 1999 does not provide an1'time-frame for a decision or any guarantee of eventual membership for
all the central European countries which are associate partners in WEU;
(ii) Recalling that enlargement of the European Union is a very lengthy process, contingent upon
various problematic conditions which have nothing to do with the securiq' needs of the central European
countries concerned;
(iii) Underlining therefore the increasing importance of the fact that WEU is the only European se-
curitv organisation in rvhich the countries concerned already have a voice;
(iv) Concerned that any multinational arrangements behveen WEU and the European Union might
affect the rights acquired by these countries in the framework of WEU:
(v) Regretting therefore that the WEU Council of Ministers'Bremen Declaration of l0-ll May
1999 does not contain any commitment to preserve the role and participation of WEU's associate part-
ners in a future European Security and Defence Identitv-
TNSTRUCTS ITS POLITICAL COMMITTEE
L To examine closelv the decisions taken by the EU Council in Cologne on 3.{ June 1999 and their
consequences for WEU's associate partners:
2. To prepare a progress report on the subject for the next session of the Assembly, including pro-
posals to ensure that the associate partners can participate appropriatelf in the further development of a
European Securiw and Defence Identit-v in the framervork of the EU, with at least the same rights as
they currently enjoy within WEU.
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Explanatory Memoran du m
(sahmitted by Mr Mart{nez Casafi, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. The group of WEU associate partners cur-
rently consists of seven countries which ten vears
ago were recognised as forming part of the Soviet
bloc. Their relationship with WEU has alual's been
substantial and drnamic in murv respects. It all
began at the institutional level first of all in the Fo-
rum of Consultation (1992). Ties rrere then devel-
oped in the Kirchberg Declaration (1994) u'hich
officiallv created associate partrership status. ln the
beginning. nine countries tvere involved later to
become ten uith the accession of Slovenia in 1996.
There are no\\' seven since the Czech Republic.
Hungary and Poland left the group to join the asso-
ciate members. Finally'- and perhaps most impor-
tantlr,- the actual substance of the relationship has
developed significantlv. offering associare partners
the possibili[' not only of participating in WEU's
activities on a political level and contributing to the
decision-making process but also of taking part in
the planning and execution of Petersberg missions
as rvell as in the day-today u'ork of all WEU bodies
on a poffnanent basis. The decisions taken in Erfurt
conccming the "Practical arrangements for partici-
pation of associate partrers in Petersberg opera-
tions" should be mentioned here as a most important
step in this dlnamicalll'developing relationship uith
the Organisation as a uhole and also the fact that
thc central and eastem European countries are as-
piring to membership of the European Union and
the Atlantic Alliance.
2. It is perhaps more important than ever
before 
- 
norv that the Washington Summit has
made clear that any further enlargemeut of
NATO can be ruled out in the near future rvhile.
at the same time- decisions concerning WEU's
integration into the European Union are imminent
- 
to stress that the associate partnership relation-
ship has been a success. both politically'. b1'en-
hancing securitl,in Europe, and as regards the
increasingly' mcaningful participation by associ-
ate partners in WEU's politico-military organs. It
is perhaps more appropriate than at anl' other
time to remind the governments and the Council
that the status of the associate partners and its
practical implications are one of the most impor-
tant aspects of the sum total of WEU's achieve-
ments, enhancing both European countries se-
curitl'and political convergence betu'een them. [t
is clear that the capital built up through this dy-
namic and creative participation rvhich has lasted
for almost a decade, must not be lost as a result
of the associate partners being left out of the
procedure for the future involvement of WEU in
the European Union sphere.
IL The clevelopment of associate partner status
1. The institutionul role of ussociate purtners
3. The status of associate partners has been
enhanced as a result ofthe initiatives undertaken
b1' tw'o main groups. The associate partners'
interest in strengthening their ties with the or-
ganisation derives not onll' from their desire to
participate in the European security debate. but
also their overall "European vocation" or desire
to be integrated into western structures. ln this
connection. participation in one organisation is
regarded both as a potential u'ay' of establishing
Iinks u'ith other European institutions and an
opportunitl,for deeper involvement in them in the
future. Some of the full members of WEU- in
particular Germanv. lvhose geographic proximitl'
to the associate partners explains its particular
interest in the stabiliry' of the region and its inte-
gration into European institutional structures-
have also stronglv supported initiatives to en-
hance the status ofassociate partners.
4. Pre-dating the establishment of associate
partner status. several steps torvards establishing
links rvith central and eastern European countries
n'ere undertaken as early as l99l and 1992.
A series of fact-finding missions authorised b1'
thc Secretary-General and the WEU Presidencl"
constituted the first attempts to develop relations
rvith central and eastem European countries. At
the same time. some initial contacts rvere made
rvith the WEU Assembll' and the lnstitute for
Securit-v Studies rather than rvith the Council.
Recommendalion 479 on "the establishment of a
just, peaceful and secure order in Europe 
- 
pros-
pects stemming from developments in central and
eastern Europe"r. lvhich mainll' focused on ne-
Foopt.n at an e(raordinar.v session of the Assembll'
in Lurembourg.22 and 23 Mzrch 1990.
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gotiations on the CFE (Conventional Forces in
Europe) Treaty, already showed an early concern
on the part of thc Assembly for the situation in
these countries.
5. In a communiqudr the Council issued
shortlv after, '-Ministers agreed on the oppor-
tuneness of establishing contacts for two-wav in-
formation vsith the democratically elected gov-
ernments in central and eastern Europe"- in-
structing the Presidency and the Secrctan,-
General to organise these contacts. Finallv. a
Forum of Consultation rvas set up in 1992 rvith
the aim of institutionalising multilateral contacts
rvith central and eastern European countriess.
This consisted essentialll, of annual meetings of
Foreign and Defence Ministers and six-monthlv
meetings at ambassadorial level. At the same
time. regular exchange of documents and infor-
mation was encolrraged. Apart from dealing u'ith
issues such as arrns control. the future European
securitr,' architecture and disarmament, discus-
sion in the Forum of Consultation focused on the
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
6. The consultative partner status lvas re-
placed bv that ofassociate partner. established at
the Kirchberg WEU Council meeting on 24 Ma1'
1994. lt covered nine nerv democracies ofcentral
and castern Europe rvhich had signed a Europe
Agreement with the EU. i.e. Poland, the Czech
Republic- Hungary- Slovakia, Romania, Bul-
garia. Estonia. Latvia and Lithuania. Slovenia
became the tenth associate partner in 1996.
7. According to the communique referred to
and the ''Document on a Status of Association
u'ith WEU'{. this status is intended to:
"allow those countries [lvho had alreadl,
concluded or u,ould conclude a Europe
agreement lvith the European Union] to
participate to a larger extent in the activi-
ties of WEU and to be involved in initia-
tives and missions as envisaged in the
Petersberg Declaration".
--ffiuniqud issued after the meering of the WEU
Council of Ministen, Brussels. 23 April 1990.
3 Declaration issued after the extmordinary meeting of
the WEU Council of Ministers with states of central
Europ. BonrU 19 June 1992.
a Kirchberg Declaration 24 lvlay 1994.
The objectives related to this status are as fol-
lorvs:
relations betr,veen associate partners
and other members should be broad-
ened and deepened in parallel to the
closer cooperation of these states lvith
the European Union. Associate part-
ners' participation in the Organisation
should prepare them for their integra-
tion and eventual accession to the
European Union 
- 
lvhich u,ould make it
possible for them to become full mem-
bers of WEU in the future:
the development of closer relations with
these countries'-through cooperation
lvith the Alliance framervork, in par-
ticular the Partnership for Peace pro-
gramme" and uithin WEU is intended
to be mutually reinforcing:
consolidating the stability of institu-
tions. guaranteeing democracv- the rule
of larv. human rights. and respect for
protection of minorities.
A provision describing the principles of refrain-
ing from the use of force as a base for relations
among WEU countries and associate partners
advocated:
the settlement of differences by peace-
ful means. in accordance rvith the obli-
gations arising from the United Nations
Charter, the commitments entered into
under the terms of the Helsinki Final
Act and the Paris Charter and the gen-
erally recognised principles and rules of
international lalv:
and refraining from resorting to the
threat or use of force- in accordance
tvith the United Nations Charter.
8. The rights of participation conferred bv
their nelv status enabled associate partners to:
participate in meetings of the Council.
u'ith the condition that they could not
veto a decision:
participate. on invitation. in u'orking
groups on a case-by-case basis;
be briefed on the activities of the
rvorking groups;
have a liaison arrangement lvith the
Planning Cell:
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associate themselves lvith decisions
taken by the Council regarding Peters-
berg missions, i.e. those involving
peacekeeping, crisis management and
humanitarian tasks;
participate in Petersberg missions- as
rvell as to offer forces for specific op-
erations, the modalities of their partici-
pation in the command structures and
decision-making process being subject
to agreement on a case-by-case basis.
Moreover, associate partners were not obliged to
make any contribution to the budget and lvere
required to enable WEU to perform its role both
as the defence component of the EU and as the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. ln ac-
cordance with the intention of the then Secretary-
General- Mr Van Eekelen, not to bring these
countries to a position too close to that of the
associate members or observers, associate part-
ners were originally excluded from the Council's
rvork rvhen it related to relations with NATO or
the EU, Article V matters and institutional af-
fairs.
9. Since its establishment, associate partner
status has been developed progressively. In the
political field, one of the most important exer-
cises rvas the joint drafting of a "Common Se-
curity Concept" on the challenges to European
security and possible WEU response, issued at
the 1995 Madrid Ministerial meeting rvith the
participation of all27 WEU countries. As a rule,
the WEU Council nolv meets once a week,
meetings at 2l altemating with meetings at 28, in
accordance with the provisions set dorvn in the
document of 3 May 1994 on the modalities of
associate partner status. Gradually, the WEU
Council has opened up some areas for discussion
at 28 and allowed associate partners to partici-
pate in an increasing number of lvorking groups
on an ad hoc basis. A Permanent Council de-
cision allowing for the extension of associate
partner participation in WEU working groups is
mentioned in the Lisbon Declaration of 1995.
Topics dealt with at 28 currently include:
within the Council and the Council
Working Group: cooperation with the
OSCE and UN. dialogue rvith Russia
and Ukraine, regional cooperation and
the Transatlantic Forum;
- rvithin the Politico-Military Group:
crisis in Albania. African peacekeeping
and landmine clearance:
lvithin other groups: WEU operational
development, planning and conduct of
exercises and the Mediterranean dia-
logue.
10. Opening the Council Working Group on
the Transatlantic Forum and the Mediterranean
Group to associate partners has been the most
recent improvement in this domain. approved
onlv last year (1998). Until then- only trt'o per-
manent Working Groups out of six met regularly
at 28: the CWG (Council Working Group) and
the PMG (Politico-Military Group). Norv, par-
ticipation by associate partners in meetings of the
Military Delegates Committee is also provided
for. Moreover, the PMG at 28 is examining pos-
sibilities of strengthening participation b1' asso-
ciate partners in WEU activities5. In particular,
the lack of associate partner involvement in the
Open Skies group, or in WEU's institutional
links rvith NATO has been questioned. the latter
constituting a fundamental foreign policy interest
ofcentral and eastern European countries.
I l. With regard to armaments cooperation and
WEAG (Western European Armaments Group),
the upgrading of associate partner status has
progressed slowly and has not been defined for
several reasons. WEAG is still at a poor stage of
development, lvhich explains why full members
are cautious about involving other countries until
the scope of the cooperation is definitively
agreed. WEAG remains only loosely linked to
WEU and its membership does not completel]'
coincide rvith that of the Organisation. Further-
more, while it is clear that WEAG membership is
not linked to WEU or any other organisation, the
admission criteria are not yet fully defined.
12. The major breakthrough in this domain
relates to modalities of involvement granted to
the associate partners at the Council meeting in
Erfurt in November 1997, rvhere the Council
issued a Declaration agreeing to "further open
t...] WEAG to those nations"6 and which foresaw
the possibility for them to be invited to:
i S."*O part of the forty-fourth annual report of the
Council to the Assembly (for the period 1 July-3l Dec-
ember 1998). Paris, 8 April 1999.
t Erfrrrt Declaratioru lE November 1997.
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assist panels (mainly on issues such as
Research and Technologv-. Equipment
Requirements and Programmes) on a
case-by-case basis:
be involved in meetings of the staff
group, of NADs (National Armaments
Directors) and of WEAG Ministers:
participate in specific armaments pro-
jects, in which case the1, rvould do so
on the same basis as full members.
13. Concerning the Eurogroups. associate
partners may be involved as non-voting observ-
ers- but the EurolongtermT steering group and its
rvorking groups may yet decide to restrict par-
ticipation. Some progress has been made- lvith
WELG (Western European Logistics Group)
already allowing the participation of associate
partners in its meetings and Eurolongterm having
invited them to its next meeting. Eurocomt has
alreadv made provision to brief associate part-
ners on its activities subject to Council approval
and is currentlv studying the modalities for their
involvement in the future. The WEU Council of
Ministers only very recently tasked the Perma-
nent Council to examine possibilities of partici-
pation for associate parbrers and observers in the
space activities field, so no arrangements have
been finalised yet.
14. Not onl1, did participation by associate
partners in the lvork of the Assembly pre-date
their involvement in the Council. it rvas also a
determining factor in facilitating the establish-
ment of contacts with the Organisation. The as-
sociate partner delegations to the Assemblv com-
prise four representatives with the exception of
the Baltic states. which have tw'o. A single parl-
iamentarian is in charge of representing each
delegation in the Defence- Political. Technologi-
cal and Aerospace and Parliamentary and Public
Relations Committees. No representation in the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admini-
stration or the Committee on Rules of Procedure
and Privileges is foreseen. There is no participa-
tion in the Presidential Committee either.
15. In the operational field, follorving the
Kirchberg Declaration- liaison arrangements
-Eo.oglorp 
rvorking group for long-term milirary
plarning.t Eur roup working group for the interoperabiliqv of
the tactical communications systems of land forces.
making information exchange possible were con-
cluded betrveen the Planning Cell and associate
partners. These are currently being revised to
ensure effective preparation rvith a vierv to their
possible use during WEU operations. The same
process is under rva1, in relation to possible as-
sociate partner involvement in the WEU Satellite
Centre's activities.
16. The finalisation of these liaison arrange-
ments was made possible b-v-- the aforementioned
decisione by the Permanent Council, uhich also
allorved for the identification of the forces asso-
ciate partners rvould wish to make available for
WEU operations. A number of associate partners
have also signed security' agreements providing a
legal basis for the exchange of classified docu-
ments. intelligence and situation reports- which
can be circulated to them u'ith the originator's
consent. In turn, most of them have supplied
information on their armed forces and have des-
ignated units to be included in the FAWEU list
and be considered by the Planning Cell as neces-
sary. At the present moment- the FAWEU data-
base contains contributions from six out of the
seven associate partnerslt'. In 1996, it rvas agreed
that associate partners could participate in the
planning and conduct of exercises, so that at the
beginning of the follorving vear they participated
in WEU's first annual exercise conference. In a
recent speech- Secretary-General Cutileiro drew
attention to thc participation of some associate
partners in WEU's police operation in Albania-
as rvell as in the latest internal crisis-management
exercise Crisex '9811.
17. With regard to associate partner involve-
ment in Petersberg missions, the Kirchberg Dec-
laration had already indicated that associate
partners might participate in their implementation
and planning unless a majoritl, of member states
decided othenvise. It u,as also agreed that if theyjoined operations by committing forces, they
rvould have the same obligations as other partici-
pants as lvell as the right to be included in the
trl-irUon Oeclaration, l8 Mav 1995.
'o Second part of the fortv-iourth annual report of the
Council. Paris. 8 April, 1999: Chapter Yl77 (Forces
ansrcrable to II'EQ.
" Josd Cutileiro: Address to the EAPC Seminar on
Securiqv and Stabilit-v in Central Europe, Bratislava. 19
Janua{v 1999.
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command structures and in the Council's subse-
quent decision-making process.
18. The Birmingham Declaration of May 1996
reaffrrms a determination to involve all WEU
countries in the operational dimension of WEU in
accordance with their status. mentioning a report
to the Permanent Council on measures taken to
put this into practice- especially lvith regard to
African peacekeeping- exercise policy and hu-
manitarian task force operations. The declaration
also rvelcomed an agreement to:
extend information-sharing and brief-
ings on WEU crisis-management pro-
cedures. WEU's role in peacekeeping
and WEU armaments and space ques-
tions:
further enhance the associate partners'
participation in the ongoing lvork on
the development of the operational role
of WEU.
Finally. practical arrangements for participation
by associate partners in Petersberg operations
were approved at the Erfurt ministerial meeting
in November 1997, which defined their involve-
ment in the different phases of the crisis-man-
agement process, lvith particular regard to the
planning and forces generation process.
19. The Multinational Peace Force South-
Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) constitutes one of the
most recent arrangements for future operational
involvement of associate partners. This force,
established by Italy, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria,
Albania, Romania and the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia in September 1998. rvill
be available for peace-support missions" led b1,
WEU. the LN, NATO or OSCE. It will be a
non-standing force comprising a 2 000-strong
brigade, to be structured according to the specific
missions it will have to accomplish. The com-
mand of the force and its headquarters rvill rotate
every trvo and four years respectively betlveen
the seven nations. In this corurection. it should be
mentioned that Hungary and Slovenia are already
cooperating lvith Italy setting up the Multina-
tional Land Force, rvhich is expected to become
operational b1, the end of the year and will be
rfn trairg conflict-prerention, peacekeeping, peace-
building, peacemaking and humanitarian operatiors.
declared anslverable to WEU for Petersberg-Epe
missions.r3
20. According to Monika Wohlfeld'+. "even if
no formal commitment has been taken at this
stage", associate partners lvill be substantially
involved in Petersberg missions unless a decision
to exclude them is taken from the outset. Holv-
ever, some important points should be noted.
Where WEU operations make use of NATO as-
sets and capabilities, the involvement of associate
partners l'ill be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Participation in operations by associate partners
will depend on the extent to lvhich other members
rvill be willing to make use of their help r,vhen
conflicts arise. as the formulation of the terms of
involvement is subject to interpretation and the
extent to which associate partners will be able to
contribute effectively to operations, considering
their manpower and equipment resources.
2. WEU missions with the participation
of associate parlners
21. The first occasion for operational coop-
eration betlveen WEU and the central and eastern
European countries arose in connection lvith the
disturbances in former Yugoslavia from l99l on-
lvards. In vielv of the tragic turn of events. the
UN Security Council decided in 1992 (Resol-
utions 757 and 787) to impose a trade embargo
on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). It
very soon became apparent that the embargo rvas
being circumvented. particularlv on the Danube.
ln 1992- Romania lvas the first to ask the WEU
Council for help in enforcing the UN Securiry'
Council resolutions. WEU's relations rvith the
countries bordering on FRY at that time fell
within the ambit of the Forum of Consultation.
Those countries were just emerging from the
communist era and r,vere probably politicallv and
physically incapable of conducting an effective
blockade against the FRY. In March 1993- the
WEU Permanent Council accepted the principle
of an international police action and this rvas
confirmed by the WEU Council of Ministers
meeting in Luxembourg (5 April 1993). A mem-
orandum of understanding was signed betrveen
WEU and Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary and
250 police and customs officers from seven
13 Rome Declaration 27 November 1998.
't Monika Wohlfeld, "Closing the Gap", in: IIEU at
rtfr.v, ed. Guido Lenzi, WEU Institute for Securitv
Studies, Paris 1998.
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member states (France, Germany, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal- Spain and the United
Kingdom) were deployed on the Danube at three
points: Calafat (Romania), Ruse (Bulgaria) and
Mohacs (Hungary).
22. Although the mission lvas only moderately
successful, it was the first practical instance of
cooperation betlveen WEU and its associate
parmers. The operation ended in October 1996
after the signing of the Dayton Accords and the
deployment of IFOR. As a result, the sanctions
against the FRY rvere lifted by the UN SecuriS'
Council (Resolution 1074 of I October 1996)
and the WEU Council wound up the operation on
2 October 1996.
23. Operation Alba, in the words of Secretary-
General, Mr Cutileiro, rvas a "missed opportu-
nity" for WEU. It was impossible to obtain a
consensus for the deployment of a WEU force
and an operation lr-as therefore mounted, on the
basis of the UN Security Council Resolution, in
the form of an ad hoc coalition under the aegis of
the OSCE. In [alv, this was therefore not a WEU
mission. It should however be noted that all the
members of the coalition were WEU members,
either full members (ltaly, France, Spain. Greece,
Belgium, Portugal)- associate members (Turkey),
observers (Austria, Danmark), or associate part-
ners (Romania, Slovenia). Some 7 000 troops
rvere involved in the operation, which was de-
signed to facilitate the delivery and distribution
of humanitarian aid. The mission was deplo-v-ed
from 15 April 1997 and wound up on 12 August
1997, having been extended for 45 days. The
mission's objectives were limited but it did never-
theless manage to prevent total anarchy and re-
store enough stabilit-v for general elections to be
held. Although, the operation was not strictly
speaking led by WEU, it provided another oppor-
tumty for practical cooperation between WEU
member states and associate partners. Romania
provided an infantry battalion (398 troops) and
Slovenia deployed a 24-strong medical unit.
24. A recent opportunity for operational in-
volvement of associate partners arose with the
creation of the Multinational Advisory Police
Element (MAPE), which is carrying out a WEU-
led operation aimed at re-establishing a viable
police force in Albania. On 13 March 1997, the
Standing Committee of the WEU Assembly re-
commended that the Council keep a close watch
on the situation in Albania and instruct the Plan-
ning Cell to draw up plans for possible future
operations. Two members of the Planning Cell
were dispatched to Albania on a fact-finding
mission and the PMG was instructed, as of
l0 April 1997, to investigate the possibilrty of
rapid deployment of a multinational detachment
on the lines of the police mission to Mostar. Fol-
lowing these deliberations, the Permanent
Council decided on 2 May 1997 to set up MAPE
to assist the Albanian lalv and order forces.
25. The MAPE mission was designed to ad-
vise the Albanian police on keeping order and to
train instructors, but not to take direct charge of
police operations. A substantial number of asso-
ciate partners participated in MAPE: Romania
Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania. Latvia,
Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia (i.e. all
ofthem except Slovakia). MAPE was thus a new
experiment in cooperation since, in addition to
the associate partners, all the member states ex-
cept Belgium participated in the mission. MAPE
developed from an idea for a specific action into
a more long-term vision based on three prin-
ciples: progress, durability and coordination. The
mission, now comprising 95 officers, lvas extend-
ed for a further year in April 1999. The operation
has also been extended and reinforced as a con-
sequence of the European Council decision to in-
clude it as part of its common action plan.
III. The NATO Summit and the implications
of NATO enlargement for associote portners
26. The Washington Summit held from 24 to
26 Aprll produced two key documents. In terms
of the enlargement process, the communiqu6
released at the summit strongly reiterated the
Alliance's "Open Door" policy: "We pledge that
NATO will continue to welcome new members.
Our commifrnent to enlargement is part of a
broader strategy of projecting stability and
working together lvith our Partners to build a
Europe whole and free"rs. While recognising the
progress made by applicant countries "in meeting
responsibilities and obligations" for possible
membership, no further guarantee is given to
them other than the assurance that their candidat-
ures will remain "under active consideration".
Beuragnpt T of the communique, 24 Aprtl 1999.
DOCUMENT 1649
27. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is
defined in the first paragraph as a "programme
of activities to assist aspiring countries in their
preparations for possible future membership".
The preamble reiterates the principle of NATO's
''Open Door" policy and makes reference to its
legal basis. Article l0 of the North Atlantic
TreaR reads:
--The parties may, by unanimous agree-
ment. invite any other European State in a
position to further the principles of this
Treafy and to contribute to the securitv of
the North Atlantic area to accede to this
Treaty. (...)''
Reference is also made to paragraph 8 of the
Madrid Summit Declaration:
''We reaffirm that NATO remains open to
new members under Article l0 of the
North Atlantic Treaty. (...) No European
democratic country lvhose admission
rvould fulfil the objectives of the Treaty
rvill be excluded from consideration."
However, NATO repeatedly makes clear that it
neither undertakes any commitment to grant
membership on the basis of participation in this
prograrnme nor assumes an), responsibility for
the possible consequences of its follow-up:
"It must be understood that decisions made
by aspirants on the basis of advice re-
ceived lvill rernain national decisions un-
dertaken and implemented at the sole re-
sponsibilitv of the country concerned"l6.
(...) "Participation in the Membership Ac-
tion Plan...does not imply any time-frame
for any such decision nor any guarantee of
eventual membership. The programme can-
not be considered as a list of criteria for
membership"lT.
According to the communiqud, the process will
be revised at the next summit meeting which lvill
be held before the end of 2002.
28. As explained in paragraph 2 of the pre-
amble to the Plan, ''the programme offers aspi-
rants a list of activities from which they may
select those they consider of most value to help
them in their preparations". Each country lvill
E vraP, Pr.u*Ule. paragraph 2.
'' MAP: Preamble, paragraph 3.
draw up a national programme on preparations
for possible future membership, thus keeping the
Alliance informed of aspirants' progress. Feed-
back and advice to them rvill be provided through
mechanisms based on those currently used for
Partners: meetings with the Council, the Interna-
tional Staff, NATO Team workshops and other
bodies in a l9+l format. The NATO Team,
headed by an Assistant Secretary-General, rvill
liaise closely rvith the appropriate NATO bodies
regarding advice to aspirants. Horvever. a certain
flexibilin' is suggested by thc statement: '-Rele-
vant procedures rvill be refined over time as ex-
perience is gained." The Alliance will dravr,up a
report for each candidate on a yearly basis,
which lvill provide feedback focused on progress
made in the areas covered in their programmes.
Upon submission, the Council will discuss the
document rvith the country concerned.
29. The Membership Action Plan covers spe-
cific areas. Concerning political and economic
issues, aspirants are to shorv commitment to the
peaceful settlement of disputes, refraining from
the threat or use of force, to the rule of lalv, to
establishing democratic control of their armed
forces, to a continued engagement in the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership for Peace and to promoting
stabilit-v and u'ell-being by economic liberly,
social justice and environmental responsibility.
Candidates will have to provide information on
both their policies and the state of their economy
for discussion with the Senior Political Commit-
tee and the allies.
30. Concerning defence and military issues, it
is stressed that:
''The ability of aspiring countries to con-
tribute militarily to collective defence and
to the Alliance's new missions and their
rvillingness to commit to gradual im-
provements in their military capabilities
will be factors to be considered in deter-
mining their suitabilitl' for NATO mem-
bership."
It is further indicated that:
''any future NATO facilities established
for the assessment of Partrrer forces for
NATO-led peace support operations and
of partner performance in NATO/PfP ex-
ercises and operations will be used to as-
sess the degree of interoperability and the
DOCUMENT 16+9
range of capabilities of aspirants'
forces"lE.
Measures for developing capabilities of the
armed forces as lrell as enhancing interoperabil-
it1' are also proposed. At the request of candi-
dates, Individual Partnership Programmes focus-
ing on areas perceived to deserve special atten-
tion may'be issued. Annual clearing-house meet-
ings lvill be held to coordinate bilateral and
multilateral assistance. Planning targets specifi-
cally covering areas most directl,v relevant in the
case of each countfv will be elaborated rvithin the
framervork of the Planning and Review Process
and on the basis of consultation. Also. candidates
may'be invited to observe and participate in some
phases of NATO-only exercises.
31. The plan provides for advice to be given to
aspirants on their defence spending and on safe-
guards and procedures to ensure the security of
sensitive information. Provision is also made for
NATO Team rvorkshops to brief countries on
legal issues. In turn- candidates should scrutinise
their domestic larv for compatibilitl' lvith the
legal agreements thev would be expected to ac-
cede to should the-v" join NATO.
32. Special provisions u'ere adopted by the
WEU Permanent Council in February 1998 for
the prospective NATO members u'hich lvere
consequentlv prospective WEU associate mem-
bers as rvell. They lvere to be allorved to attend
discussions on issues related to WEU's coopera-
tion uith the Alliance, thus helping them prepare
for the prospect of associate membershipr'. Thev
rvere also to be briefed on the status of associate
member by either the Secretariat-General or the
Presidency on questions concerning budgetary
contributions, military staff and security' agree-
ments. In the prograrnme of the German WEU
Presidency for the first halfof 1999- the intention
of "preparing the accession of the three future
members of the Alliance to WEU as associate
members" was explicitll, stated. Also. lrhen re-
ferring to the revision of the Military Staff, the
Declaration reads: "An interim solution rvill also
be required to take into account the future incor-
poration of the new WEU associate members"2o.
Follorving tle accession to NATO of the Czech
il fra,qP' Cf,upter II. paragraph 3.
re Rhodes Declaratioru 15 May 1998.
to Rome Declaratioq 27 November 1998.
Republic. Hungary and Poland on 12 March
1999. the Permanent Council of WEU granted
them associate member status on 23 March2r.
33. In some respects. associate partner status
is beneficial to the countries concerned. Some de-
gree of involvement in armaments cooperation.
an area of major interest to them. has been
achieved2r. The possibilrtl' of dialogue and in-
formation exchange- creating a culture of regular
lvork in cornmon, is of value in itself. as rvell as
being ps1'chologicall_"- positive. Furthermore.
some other points which might render the asso-
ciation lvith WEU interesting for central and
eastern European countries in the future can be
identified. On WEU taking up its envisaged role
as a European defence instrument. it could pos-
sibly act in situations in lv'hich NATO rvould not
and this could potentially affect associate partner
countries, thus opening up for them the option of
participating in a multilateral intervention. In
contrast to the enlargement of NATO, central
European involvement with WEU is not
negatively vierved by Russia. with r,vhich WEU
enjoys good relations. But on the other hand.
according to Monika Wohlfeld's analvsis23, the
unmet expectations of the associate partners are
mainly the lack of participation in the institu-
tional links betvveen NATO and WEU 
- 
rvith the
exception of the prospective NATO members 
-
the lack of the certain prospect of future mem-
bership and the lack of securit_v guarantees. As
regards the prospects for a possible further
enhancement of the associate partners' status, the
current German Presidency declares in its pro-
gramme its intention to support their future in-
volvement in the discussion of WEU's contri-
bution to the NATO Force Planning Process.
However, the formulation seems too vague at
present to allolv much hope for real advances.
IV NATO's future enlargement policy
34. The Alliance has not issued any new invi-
tations to candidate countries to accede to the
Washington Treafy". A large section of the com-
muniqud is nonetheless devoted to the issue of
enlargement and the Alliance has even adopted
' 
e..=*Ufy Document 1642.
22 f'lre Paris Declaration of 13 Mav lgg':. llrrd, alreadv
made reference to associate partner interest in this area.
" Monika Wohlfel4 iDid.
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an action plan on this point. In paragraph 7 of
the communique- the Allies state their intentions
as follorvs:
''We reaffirm today our commitment to the
openness of the Alliance under Article l0
of the North Atlantic Treaty and in accor-
dance luth paragraph 8 of the Madrid
Summit Declaration. We pledge that
NATO rvill continue to n'elcome nerv
members in a position to further the prin-
ciples of the Trea[' and contribute to
peace and securirv* in the Euro-Atlantic
area. This is part of an evolutionary pro-
cess that takes into account political and
securiq' developments in the u'hole of
Europe. Our commitment to enlargement
is part of a broader strategy of projecting
stability and rvorking together with our
Partners to build a Europe rvhole and free.
The ongoing enlargement process streng-
thens the Alliance and enhances the secu-
rit-v and stabilitl, of the Euro-Atlantic
region. The three new members lvill not be
the last".
35. Some aspiring members are explicitly
mentioned. The first seven to be mentioned are
all associate partners of WEU. With regard to
Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithua-
nia, the Alliance "recognises" their efforts and
progress, u'hile in the case of Bulgaria and Slo-
vakia, it ''notes" the ''recent positive" develop-
ments. Concerning FYROM, the Alliance rvel-
comes its progress on reforms and with regard to
Albania, it "encourages" its reform efforts.
Should the nuances expressed here be taken as a
ranking of the membership prospects of the dif-
ferent countries?
36. Rather it rvould seem that the Alliance
wishes to defer the whole process, since, accord-
ing to the communique- it has decided to take
stock of this question at its next summit meeting,
to be held at the latest in 2002. lt is therefore not
to be expected that any decisions to issue further
invitations will be made before that date. In the
meantime it would seem 
- 
judging by the Wash-
ington communique 
- 
that the Alliance has im-
posed additional conditions on aspiring members
u'hich do not make it easier for them.
37. Thus this is how the Alliance wishes to
acknorvledge the efforts made by the countries
concemed to improve their relations with their
neighbours and contribute to securitl'and stabil-
iry in the Euro-Atlantic region. Everyone knorvs
that the word "neighbour" in man)' cases means
Russia and that to a large extent it depends on
Russia whether certain candidate countries. such
as the Baltic states- can improve their position.
38. The Alliance, as indicated in the commu-
niqu6. "expects to extend further invitations in
coming years to nations r,villing and able to as-
sume the responsibilities and obligations of
membership- and as NATO determines that the
inclusion of these nations lvould serve the overall
political and strategic interests of the Alliance
and that the inclusion rvould enhance overall
European security and stability". However, even
if a candidate country fully meets the require-
ments for assuming the responsibilities and obli-
gations of membership. it has no chance of being
accepted if the Alliance comes to the conclusion
that its interests are not scrved by that country
becoming a member. Furthermore, the Alliance
reaffirms that no democratic European country
rvhose accession would serve the aims of the
Trealv will be excluded from the examination
process. w'hatever its geographic position. This
Alliance policy could equally rvell be applied to
Russia and Ukraine and, were it to take shape. it
u'ould call for in-depth reflection by the Europe-
ans on their olm security and defence policv.
39. With a view to giving the nine countries
currently aspiring to NATO membership
''advice- assistance and practical support", the
Alliance has draun up a Membership Action
Plan (MAP) lvhich has already been mentioned.
40. The text of the plan, rvhich is very de-
tailed, makes it clear tlat participation in the
MAP does not mean that any deadline has been
set for a decision or that there is any guarantee of
final membership. It does, however, set out a
rvhole range ofissues, divided into five chapters.
rvhich have to be settled before the Alliance can
invite a country to become a member2a. Thus the
Alliance imposes various obligations on candi-
date countries. including that of submitting re-
ports each vear on their economies, without of-
fering any,thing in exchange.
E f potiti*t and Economic issues: II. DefenceAvlilitary
issues: [II. Resource issues: IV. Security issuesl V. Legal
issues.
il
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41. The Atlantic Alliance has thus established
a whole set of procedures which- while they may
be considered by the candidates as marking their
entry into a pre-accession phase. expose them to
the risk of becoming so bogged down in the nu-
merous details that this can only delay the final
decision. Indeed- perhaps it is precisely the Alli-
ance's intention to prolong the procedures, but
due account must be taken of the impact of the
Kosovo conflict on the desire of certain candidate
countries to accede to the Washington Treaty.
42. Given the problems raised by the accession
of central European countries to the European
Union, there are numerous reasons for giving
fresh thought, in particular within WEU, to the
securit-v situation of those countries, since seven
of them are associate partners of WEU. Their
participation in the work of WEU and its Assem-
bly is an important asset for the Organisation.
which remains the only institution in lvhich
representatives ofthose countries have a seat and
a vote. The fact that they have little chance at
present of joining NATO and/or the European
Union only makes it more appropriate to streng-
then their participation in WEU.
43. It is not encouraging in this regard that
nothing at all was said about this question in the
declaration issued by the Council of Ministers of
WEU at the close of its meeting in Bremen on l0
and I I May 1999. On the contrary, one may rvell
rvonder about the significance of the fact that the
associate partner countfies were actually ex-
cluded from the informal meeting of EU Defence
Ministers organised by the German Presidency in
the wings of the WEU Ministerial meeting in
Bremen, to which they invited their counterparts
from the European member states of the Alliance
(as well as the associate mernber states of WEU).
It is equally strange that the German Presidency,.
rvhose prime concern has always been the secu-
ritv of the associate partner states, proposed in
its Reinhartshausen document to examine the
possibility for involvement of the associate part-
ners only at a later stage.
V Recent developments affeaing the security
of associate portners
44. Beside the upgrading of their status rvithin
the Organisation, some of the most recent events
which have occurred in the European securit-v
environment should be taken into account. On
20 April 1999 the Treaty on collective defence
between the member countries of the Common-
lvealth of Independent States expired because
their presidents failed to reach an agreement at
their meeting some weeks before. The so-called
''Tashkent Treaty" was agreed in May 1992 and
comprised nine former Soviet republics: Russia,
Uzbekistan, Belarus. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kaz-
akhstan- Kirghiaan, Tajikistan and Georgia. The
Treatv was not extended as three of the members
refused to sign, Uzbekistan's intention being to
develop some independence from Moscolv, while
Georgia and Azerbaijan lvere disappointed at
Russian troops' ineffectiveness in sorting out the
problems in the Black Sea region and Nagorno
Karabakh respectively. In order to maintain a
collective security order in the area, Russia relies
increasingl-r- on the signature of bilateral agree-
ments with the remaining ex-members, with
whom it assumes that the Tashkent Trea[, is still
tacitly in force. The newspaper Neue Ziircher
Zeitungzs takes the view that the expirv of the
Treaty is another symptom of the disintegration
of the CIS and the failure of Russian efforts to
"maintain the illusion of a common defence space
under Moscorv's leadership". In any event, the
dissolution of the Alliance leaves a securitv vac-
uum in Russia's sphere of influence and ma-v
hold serious consequences for central and eastern
European countries, even ifthey do not border on
regions identified as potential trouble spots.
45. In addition, the recently adopted New
Strategic Concept has not been received well by
Russia, which increasingly perceives NATO as a
threat to its security and as supplanting the
United Nations26. Concern over the rvay NATO
is developing in particular lvith regard to its
willingness to act without a Securitv Council
mandate, led Russian Defence Minister Sergeyev
to propose an enhancement ofboth strategic and
conventional military capabilities.
Prctgramme of the German Presidency and its
implications for associate partners
46. The prospect of WEU's integration into
the EU raises a number of potentially serious
Blnternationat 
edition, 22 Aprn 1999.
2u HoftnanrL Christiane: -RuBland will keinen Welt-
poli I sten" in Frankfurte r,4 I I ge me i n e Ze i tu ng, 28 April
1999.
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political questions about the implications for the
associate partners. The German Presidency's
proposals favour an EU capacity for action,
based on credible military capabilities in the
spirit of the Franco-British and Franco-German
Declarations on the subject and in accordance
with the principles of our Assembly's Plan for
Action. The German Presidency'27 therefore con-
siders tlvo possibilities, namely EU use of NATO
assets, or WEU's integration into the EU, with
WEU-NATO agreements being transferred to the
EU. The German Presidency reaffirms horvever
that the Alliance remains the basis of the collec-
tive defence of its members and any duplication
in this area must be avoided. Thus. it is under-
stood that Article V of the modified Brussels
Treaty will continue to apply only to states that
have also subscribed to Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty. This of course means that the
collective securit-v guarantee does not extend
either to the neutral EU countries (Austria, Fin-
land" lreland and Sweden) or to the WEU asso-
ciate partners that have not been admitted to
NATO and appear to have been more or less
abandoned to their fate.
47. This seems to us to be of particular con-
cern since. in acting in this way', western Europe
appears to be refusing to enter into any securit-v
commitment vis-ir-vis countries w'hich want to
accede both to the EU and to NATO and whose
security is of vital importance to our continent.
However, the prospects of accession these trvo
organisations hold out for the associate partners
are very vague and do not extend to all of them.
In our view, this lack of any particular interest in
the associate partners is likely to allolv a securit-v
vacuum to develop in the east and may discour-
age states whose applications for membership
have been shelved by NATO and the EU.
48. It must be emphasised that participation
by these states in the West's politico-military
bodies, including access to the databases on the
FAWEU, is in our vierv one of the major aspects
of the WEU acquis.It therefore seelns to us to be
potentially damaging for the German Presidency
to defer indefinitely an investigation into the
possibilitv of involving the associate partners
more closely in European collective security.
Also, while the German Presidency does consider
' 
See t"tt of the German pro$amme in Bulletin
Quotidien Europe No. 7425, 15lvlarch 1999.
the possibility of an EU-WEU merger- its pro-
gramme remains very vague as to the future ma-
chinery for safeguarding the acquis of coopera-
tion between WEU and its associate partners in
that event.
W. Cottclusiotts
49. Despite the many forceful statements made
recentll, on the development of a common Euro-
pean Security'and Defence IdentiS', there has not
-vet been much substance. In the Bremen Declar-
ation of l0-ll May 1999- the WEU Council in
fact left it to other institutions to decide on the
future ofWEU.
50. Not a single nerv initiative regarding the
associate partners was taken and through its
passive attitude, the Council has merell'added to
the impression of a widening gap betw'een the
countries in the mainstream of further integration
and those who are left without anv guarantee or
perspective of a time-frame or rvell-defined insti-
tutional rapprochement to clearly point the rvay
towards Europe.
51. At the same time, it is the associate part-
ners who are being called upon to cooperate in a
conflict at their borders. Thel'are being asked to
put their territory and airspace at the disposal of
NATO for an air operation against their neigh-
bour rvhich- cynicalll' enough, ma1'well end in a
solemn confirmation of Mr Milosevic as the only
head of state who decides on lvar and peace in
the Balkans. Again, a number of associate part-
ners are suffering the economic and political
consequences of a conflict uhich they did not
start and rvhose course they are unable to influ-
ence. It is even very uncertain rvhether they rvill
be rewarded for their cooperation and loyalty,
either financiall-v or politically.
52. In its Membership Action Plan, NATO
stipulates that participation in that plan "does not
imply any time-frame for such decision nor any
guarantee of eventual membership". The stabili-
sation pact for the Balkans, proposed by the EU
Presidency. is at a very early stage of drafting
and here too the perspective of EU membership
for the countries concerned may remain distant,
lvhile the question of financial compensation for
damage caused by trade losses has not yet been
discussed.
53. Further east in Europe, developments in
the field of securit-v are not very encouraging
t3
DOCUMENT ICI9
either. Russia has an ailing President and suc-
cessive governments rvhich have to cope rvith so
many urgent problems inside the country that
they seem to sink into lethargv and immobilisa-
tion for fear of making the rvrong choices. The
recent expiry of the 1992 Tashkent Treaty on
collective defence betr,veen the member countries
of the Commonwealth of Independent States is
another sign of the further unravelling of securitv
structures in that part of Europe.
54. Altogether, it seems that the increased
interest in the further development and consoli-
dation of a European Security and Defence
Identit-v lvithin the EU has brought the process of
further rapprochement of the WEU's associate
partners to a standstill. Taking account of other
developments. such as the conflict in Kosovo
lvhich may not lead to the end of Mr Milosevic's
regime as the main destabilising factor in the
region and the expiry of the Tashkent Treaty' and
further fragilisation of the political situation in
Russia. thcre is every reason to enhance the role
of WEU's associate partners in Europe's Secu-
ritv and Defence Identitv. Security and peace in
Europe camot be a privilege for the rich. it is a
right for all and the associate partners need it
more than an1'body else. In WEU and- in the
more distant future in the EU, thev must be given
the prominent position rvhich thev need and de-
serve.
t4
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APPENDIX I
Letterfrom Mr Martonyi. Minister.for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary
to Mr cle Puig, President of the WEU Assembly
Budapest, 20 April 1999
Dear Mr President,
I was pleased to receive the Plan for Action adopted by the Standing Committee of the Assembly' of
the Western European Union on 16 March.
We consider this document a very important contribution to the ongoing debate about the issues
related to the future shape of the security and defence structure of Europe.
Hungary is determined to play an actlve role in enhancing security in the Euro-Atlantic region. As a
member of NATO and as an associate member of the WEU, Hungary lvill work for a strong European
pillar and, in the framew.ork of the Alliance, for the development of a substantial ESDI. We strongly
believe that the vitalit_v of the transatlantic link rvill benefit from the development of a true, balanced
partnership in w-hich Europe is taking on a greater role and responsibility. We are convinced that
developing ESDI u/ill not result in loosening the transatlantic relationship but very much on the
contrary: that by complementing each other, these two components promote our main goal, the
enhancement of security in the lrhole Euro-Atlantic region.
Hungary rvelcomes the Franco-British Declaration on European Defence adopted in Saint Malo. We
support the intention to strengthen the capacity of the European Union to act by providing the CFSP
with the proper tools to provide political control and strategic direction of European-led military
operations for Petersberg tasks.
We also consider it essential that in case of the integration of the WEU into the European Union, the
WEU associate member and partner countries should be given a guarantee that they can fully
participate in the future arrangement between NATO and the EU, as currently provided for in the
existing agreement with the WEU.
On this occasion, I would like to express my sincere appreciation of, and thanks for, the significant
role the Assembly has played in the development of the relations and the cooperation between the
Republic of Hungary and the Western European Union.
Allow me to take this opportunity to reassure you of my highest conSideration.
Yours sincerely,
J6.nos Martonyi
l5
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APPENDX II
Letterfrom Mr Kriitopans. Prime Minister of the Republic of Latvia,
tct Mr de Puig, President of the WEU Assembly
Riga. 20 April 1999
Dear Mr President-
I would like to thank you for the document Time for Defence. adopted by the Standing Committee of
the Assembly of Western European Union.
As an associate partner in WEU- Lawia is closely following the current debate on European security
and defence policy. The Plan for Action proposed by the WEU Assembly assures me of the great
importance that the fusembly attaches to the role of the associate partners in WEU, and I lvould like to
thank you for your support.
I look forward to continuous successful cooperation in the future.
Yours sincerely-
Vilis KriStopans
Prime Minister
l6
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APPENDIX TII
Letterfrom Mr Stankevicius, Ministerfor Defence of the Republic ctf Lithuania,
tct Mr de Puig, President of the WEU Assembly
30 April 1999
Dear Mr President,
I would like to thank you for your letter and for the copy of the WEU Assembly Plan for Action
Time for Defence that rvas adopted by the Standing Committee in Paris on 16 March 1999.
We believe that the strengthening of the Transatlantic Link is indispensable for the security of the
North Atlantic Area. Consequently, the European Securitl,and Defence ldentity should be developed in
the framework of NATO, not outside it. It is of particular significance that the Washington Summit
Communiqu6 issued by the Heads of State and Govemment participatir,g in the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 24 April 1999, furthered these ideas. Thus. the WEU
Assembl-r" document is in concert rvith the conclusions of the NATO Summit.
Lithuania values the WEU as the only international security institution, rvhich through the flexibility
and variety of status of the states involved in its activities, is making a very valuable contribution to the
European and Transatlantic integration. Therefore, we support further development of the WEU as a
stronger pillar of NATO and highly appreciate the role the WEU Assembly plays in the process of
integration and attach great expectations to the activities of the institution you chair.
I avail myself of this opportunity to assure you of my highest personal consideration.
Respectfully,
Ceslovas Stankevicius
t7
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APPENDIX IV
Letterfrom Mr Geremek. Minister.fttr Foreign Affairs qfthe Rephlic qf Poland,
to Mr de Puig, President of the WEU As:;embly
6 April 1999
Dear Mr President,
I rvould like- first of all, to thank vou for presenting me the text of the Plan for Action adopted by' the
Standing Committee of the Assembl-v- of WEU. As the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, I
noted it r,r'ith special interest and satisfaction. The document is a proof of the vital importance of the on-
going discussion on European Defence in r,vhich Poland, as a member of the Atlantic Alliance and
Associate Member of the WEU. is willing and prepared to participate. Your paper constitutes, indeed. a
valuable and stimulating input into the debate.
The Assemblv has always played a double role in the institutional structure of the WEU - that of a
source of democratic control rvith regard to other bodies of the Organisation as rvell as of a source of
learned advice and fresh insight. deprived of schematic approach. into matters rvith relevance to the
operations of the WEU. It is the latter that makes for the genuine and uniquc position of the WEU
Assembll,in the netlvork of European institutions lvith a securiS'dimension.
Bearing that in mind, I rvelcome the Plan for Action not onll'as invaluable food-for-thought material
but also as a set of well-founded recommendations we, politicians, can ahvavs drarv on. The more so as
your conclusions correspond in their great part to the principles adhered to by the Polish Government.
Sharing rvith 1,ou the conviction that the emerging European security and defence policl, is a matter
of prime importance for the future arrangement of the securiry' scene on the Continent, I am looking
fonvard to seeing the Plan for Action implemented to the extent possible to the securiq' benefit of the
rvhole Euro-Atlantic area.
I remain rvith kind regards.
Yours,
Bronislaw Geremek
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APPENDTX V
Letter from Mr Kukan, Minister for Foreign Affuirs of the Slovak Republic.
to Mr de Puig, President o-f the WEU Assembly
Bratislava, l3 April 1999
Dear President.
I rvas very pleased to receive your letter, as well as the attached Plan for Action proposed by the
Assembly of WEU, adopted by the Standing Committee on 16 March 1999 in Paris.
The policy of the Slovak Republic is directed to involve Slovakia in Euro- and transatlantic
structures. namely since the nerv Slovak Govemment rvas established in autumn 1998. WEU
membership constitutes one of our main foreign policy priorities and, at the same time, the cooperation
with WEU stands for Slovakia as an important part of preparations for both NATO and EU
membership. Slovakia supports openly implementation of proposals which lead to the strengthening of
the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), and our attention is focused on more effective
participation in WEU activities. Slovakia perceives WEU as an integral part of the EU development and
as a basic element of ESDI within NATO.
With regard to the future European security architecture- the Slovak Government follows with great
attention the latest documents of the Assembly of Western European Union and considers the idea of
future integration of WEU into EU as a positive step. ln support of this idea, Slovakia, as an associate
partner of WEU, is ready to play an active role and adopt all necessary measures to facilitate this
transformation.
Let me express my high consideration of the efforts of the Assembly of Western European Union
under your presidency for a more secure and stable Europe.
Sincerely yours,
Eduard Kukan
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